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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the relationship between disaster risk reduction and long-term adaptive 
capacity building in two climate vulnerable areas—the Cayman Islands in the Caribbean and 
Ceará, in NE Brazil. Drawing on past applications of the disaster risk reduction framework, 
we identify four critical factors that have led to reductions in risk: flexible, learning-based, 
responsive governance; committed, reform-minded and politically active actors; disaster risk 
reduction integrated into other social and economic policy processes; and a long term 
commitment to managing risk.  We find that while the presence of these factors has reduced 
overall risk in both regions, in Ceará, disaster response as it is currently practiced, has fallen 
short of addressing the fundamental causes of vulnerability that leave those prone to hazards 
able to cope in the short term, yet enmeshed in poverty and at risk from the longer term 
changes associated with climate change. Although calls for integration of disaster risk 
management with poverty eradication are not new, there has been insufficient attention paid 
in the literature on how to foster such integration. Based on the two case studies, we argue 
that the adoption of good governance mechanisms (such as stakeholder participation, access 
to knowledge, accountability and transparency) in disaster risk reduction policy may create 
the policy environment that is conducive to the kind of structural reform needed to build 
long-term adaptive capacity to climate-driven impacts. We conclude that without a 
synergistic two-tiered approach that includes both disaster risk reduction and structural 
reform, disaster risk reduction, in the face of climate changes, will prove to be an expensive 
and ineffective palliative treatment of changing risks. 
 
 
Keywords: hazards, disasters, disaster risk reduction, climate, tropical cyclone, drought, 
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1. Introduction  
“Floods are ‘acts of god,’ but flood losses are largely acts of man”. 
 (Gilbert F. White, 1945) 
 
Disaster risk managers have long known that environmental perils (such as rain, storms, high 
winds, heatwaves) that create environmental hazards (e.g. floods, landslides, drought) do not 
always have to result in disasters (see for example, White, 1945, Burton et al 1968). It is now 
almost received wisdom that natural disasters are rarely “natural”; their causes are complex, 
often attributable to a combination of socioeconomic factors that modulate, for better or 
worse, the impact of environmental hazards on human systems. More recent work (Hewitt, 
1983; Alexander, 2000; Pelling, 2003; Wisner et al., 2004; Lemos, 2007a) advances this 
thinking, highlighting that disasters are the combination of environmental hazard, poverty, 
and other causes of vulnerability – including an array of deficits and characteristics (such as 
income, age, political power, health, education, gender) – that define and shape livelihoods of 
those at risk. Often the poor, uneducated, very old or very young, the sick, the oppressed, 
experience the worst impacts of natural hazards (Comfort et al., 1999).    
 
In line with this understanding, disaster policy has evolved. First, the focus on hazard 
response (wherein interventions focussed on preparing for impacts) evolved into the active 
promotion of disaster risk reduction to reduce hazard impacts (O'Brien et al., 2006; Kwatra, 
2005; La Trobe and Davis, 2005; IFRC, 2007; Inter-agency Working Group on Emergency 
Capacity, 2007). Second, disaster risk reduction has in some cases been effectively linked to 
general risk and vulnerability reduction (Thompson and Gaviria, 2004; see for example 
Christoplos et al., 2001; Helmer and Hilhorst, 2006; Lemos, 2007a).  This shift on focus can 
partly explain the progressive decrease in the number of fatalities associated with natural 
hazards since the 1900s, especially in developed countries, see Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1 here 
 
Despite significant improvements in our understanding of hazards and disasters, the familiar 
paradox is that while managers and systems have become so much better at responding to 
hazards, the poorest in society still often experience the worst effects of hazards. 
Development gains can be rapidly lost and emergency responses can fail even in the most 
resource-endowed societies (see for example Mitchell, 1996) if continual attention and focus 
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is not directed towards enhancing access to knowledge about disaster risk reduction and 
redistributing resources towards the poorest in society to remove them from poverty. In the 
most vulnerable areas of the less developed south, for example, in drought ravaged areas of 
Africa and Latin America, high levels of hardship have persisted despite a decrease in 
casualties associated with natural hazards. The persistence of hardship and maladaptation – 
that is, when those affected cope with the hazard but never improve upon their condition 
before the disaster – suggests that however much better, disaster risk reduction still falls short 
of the goal of positive post-disaster adaptation (Glantz and Jamieson, 2000) 
 
Drawing extensively on the scholarly literature focusing on the political ecology of disasters, 
we argue that a general approach to decreasing vulnerability to short term hazards and to 
build long-term adaptive capacity to climate change involves a two-tiered strategy. As 
proposed by Wisner et al. (2004), Lemos et al. (2007) and others, disaster risk reduction 
needs to be combined with deeper levels of structural reform—such as agrarian reform, 
education and health reform, income redistribution to name few, for effective vulnerability 
reduction; it also needs to take into account intergenerational equity (Glantz and Jamieson, 
2000). Although these reforms are not usually part of disaster risk reduction in practice, their 
outcomes (e.g. higher levels of education, health care and income) are among the 
determinants of adaptive capacity often theorised in the literature as integral to disaster risk 
reduction (Brooks et al., 2005). Calls for the integration of risk reduction with structural 
reform are not new. Yet relatively little attention has been paid to designing and delivering 
this integration in practice.  
 
In this paper, we suggest that if disaster risk reduction is implemented by adopting good 
governance practices such as stakeholder participation in decision making, democratic access 
to knowledge, transparency and accountability, an indirect benefit may be generated wherein 
the pre-conditions are set for the implementation of deeper reform that can decrease overall 
vulnerability. One example is when disaster managers adopt community based participatory 
disaster response plans that encourage stakeholder mobilization and the creation of social 
capital, which in turn, challenges power inequalities at the local level (Mitchell, 2003; Allen, 
2006). Another example is when disaster risk management is integrated with long-term land 
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Therefore, it is critical not only that we find out what has enabled some countries and regions 
to fare relatively well in terms of reducing risk and how to transfer this knowledge to other 
regions but also to understand how such successes can foster long-term reduction of 
vulnerability to climate change. Identifying generic lessons from best-practice case studies of 
disaster risk reduction in different geographic regions experiencing different types of hazards 
and utilising different forms of governance may provide some insight into how disaster risk 
reduction practice can be enhanced to bring about the wider development gains as proposed 
by Wisner et al (2004). 
 
In this article, we use a multi site ethnographic approach to examine markers of success in 
disaster risk reduction in two distinctly different locations: the Cayman Islands in the 
Caribbean and the state of Ceará in Northeast Brazil. Both regions have been the subject of 
extensive previous research by the authors (Lemos, 2003; Lemos, 2007a; Tompkins, 2005; 
Tompkins and Hurlston, 2003; Lemos et al., 2002)1. Both sites have also been historically 
vulnerable to climate variability and extremes (tropical cyclones in the Cayman Islands and 
drought in NE Brazil) and their response to these climate related hazards may offer the best 
analogue available to the explain their vulnerability and adaptive capacity to climate change. 
Despite the considerable difference in GDP per capita, wealth distribution, physical 
characteristics, politics and culture, we find that there are some markers of success common 
to both areas. These markers are most obvious in the design and implementation of the 
institutions that respond to hazards and address vulnerability.  The fact that we found these 
markers of good disaster governance to be effective in both cases indicates that such practices 
may hold the promise of efficacy in a wide variety of environments, especially in less 
developed regions.   
 
Our empirical research suggested that four factors were critical to improving disaster 
management in both cases. First, the agencies and organizations responsible for disaster 
management were flexible, able to learn from past success and/or failure and to build on their 
relationship with stakeholders to push for the policy agendas and their implementation. 
Second, a group of committed, reform-minded and politically active actors in the public 
sector (in NE Brazil) and in the public and private sectors (in the Cayman Islands) 
championed a series of changes in the approach to disaster that lent it credibility and political 
feasibility. Third, these organizations and individuals sought to integrate disaster response 
into other social and economic policy processes, creating an approach to disaster response 
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that was much better fit to the changing nature of social disasters and their many stressors 
beyond the physical hazard causing them. Fourth, in both cases there was a long-term 
commitment to investing in disaster risk management and in collaborative learning-based 
approaches to managing risk. 
 
Yet, despite the fact that all four factors played a role in NE Brazil, and that response to 
drought has improved markedly in the region (Lemos, 2003; Lemos, 2007b), their effect on 
decreasing general vulnerabilities has been much slower and less far reaching than in the 
Cayman Islands. And whereas there are many reasons for the different outcomes associated 
with the application of disaster risk reduction in the two regions, we argue that the most 
critical difference that has prevented Ceará from transforming through disaster risk reduction 
in practice is the level of overall inequality that exists in Brazil. As such, vulnerability is a 
birthright determined by income distribution, political capital, access to education and health 
services and to other assets that influence the capacity of individuals and systems to cope 
with and recover from disasters (Brant, 2007). In Ceará, since progress towards decreasing 
social vulnerability and addressing underlying inequalities has been slow and insufficient, 
risk reduction, albeit much improved, can only ever maintain the status quo. 
 
Climate change is expected to increase the likelihood of disasters through three mechanisms: 
by changing the incidence and severity of weather and oceanic hazards (and potentially the 
magnitude); by increasing climate variability; and/or by increasing the vulnerability of human 
populations to multiple stressors.  The former could occur through changing weather 
conditions, such as changing precipitation, temperatures or storminess (IPCC, 2001; van 
Aalst, 2006; Hoyos et al., 2006; Knutson and Tuleya, 2004). The latter could occur through 
increased environmental and social pressures arising from both the causes and consequences 
of climate change and future development pathways (McCarthy et al., 2001; O'Brien and 
Leichenko, 2000; Few, 2003). In light of these potential additional pressures on vulnerable 
communities, efforts are needed to understand the complete role and the limits of disaster risk 
reduction in preparing for climate change. 
 
In the next sections, we explore each one of these factors in detail and in the context of the 
two case studies. Specifically, we consider how existing hazards are managed and identify 
best practice mechanisms in both cases. Finally, we qualify where these mechanisms may fall 
short to overcome existing constraints and suggest different ways to address this situation.  
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2. Hazards and the institutional conditions for effective disaster risk reduction 
 
A comprehensive body of literature has been developed over the past 50 years that describes 
the theory and application of disaster risk reduction. Various guidelines on managing natural 
hazards and reducing the damaging impacts from them have been compiled (see for example 
Thompson and Gaviria, 2004; Smith, 2001; Alexander, 2000; Burton et al., 1993; Middleton 
and O'Keefe, 1998; Wisner et al., 2004; White, 1945). The disaster risk reduction approach is 
often depicted by the circular process beginning with disaster risk “prevention” followed by 
“preparedness”, then “response” and finally “rehabilitation”, for example see (Wisner and 
Adams, 2003; White et al., 2004). Both sets of authors emphasise the two clear dimensions of 
disaster risk reduction: the short term recovery and relief aspect that is predominantly 
humanitarian, and the other longer term planning aspect which addresses sustainable 
development, see Figure 2. 
  
Figure 2 here 
 
“Preparedness” is a medium term planning activity that involves developing and testing 
disaster management plans, implementing early warning systems, stockpiling resources, 
coordinating agencies and ensuring evacuation plans work.  “Response” occurs when the 
hazard is about to happen, or is happening and involves real-time disaster response 
(assessment, coordination and relief). “Rehabilitation” focuses on recovery, taking into 
account long term planning objectives. A detailed description of the disaster risk reduction 
process can be found in (Bankoff et al., 2004; Pelling, 2003; Alexander, 2000; International 
Red Cross, 2002; Middleton and O'Keefe, 1998).  
 
This framework has been applied in many different contexts, including: drought in Mexico 
(Liverman, 1999), landslides and tsunami on the east coast of Canada (Liverman et al., 2001), 
tropical cyclones in North America (Reddy, 2000; Sobel and Leeson, 2006) and Central 
America (Rocha and Christoplos, 2001), the Caribbean (Thompson and Gaviria, 2004; 
Challenger, 2002; Berke et al., 1993; Sims and Vogelmann, 2002) and India (Palakudiyil and 
Todd, 2003; Thomalla and Schmuck, 2004), and volcanic hazard in Equador (Tobin and 
Whiteford, 2002) to cite just a few.  
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Empirical evidence from this literature suggests that when disaster management organisations 
are flexible, that is, when they can learn and adapt to changing conditions, change as they 
develop, and responsively reshape their governance structure as necessary, they can deliver 
positive disaster management processes and outcomes, see for example (2007). We find 
examples of these features in different but related areas such as integrated coastal zone 
management (Cicin-Sain, 1993; Olsen et al., 1998), social and ecological resilience (Berkes 
and Folke, 1998; Tompkins and Adger, 2004) and climate change adaptation (Berkes and 
Jolly, 2002; Berkhout et al., 2006). In addition, this literature finds that organisations that 
forge strong relationships with stakeholders, who in turn, “buy in” to the whole approach, are 
more successful at achieving their goals than those that are not (Brown et al., 2001; 
Burroughs, 1999; Brosius et al., 1998).   
 
While these elements are critical for effective disaster risk reduction, they are not always 
designed to concurrently bring about long term development. Indeed, an alternative 
‘structural’ school of thought, led by Ben Wisner, David Alexander, Mark Pelling and others, 
has argued for the need to bring together agency and behavioural change for disaster risk 
reduction with concurrent change to economic and political structures. They argue that 
specific actions have to be taken to reduce general social vulnerability. The wider disaster 
literature has paid relatively less attention to understanding empirically how to foster such 
integration. Significant attention has been paid to the challenges of structural reform for pro-
poor growth, less has been said about how different approaches to disaster risk reduction can 
create policy environments that are more or less conducive to the design and implementation 
of structural reform. We argue that good disaster risk reduction may foster structural reform 
and vice-versa, however, structural reform in areas where there are high levels of inequality 
and poverty appears to be the most important element in producing sustainable outcomes. In 
fact, it is precisely in the synergy between disaster risk reduction and structural reform that 
we believe the great opportunity for long-term effective disaster risk reduction may lie. 
Understanding both best practice and the limits of disaster risk reduction in practice should 
ensure that climate change hazards can be evaluated both in terms of their impact on risk and 
on deep rooted vulnerability.  
 
3. Best practice of disaster risk reduction: hurricane preparedness in the Cayman 
Islands 
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The Cayman Islands are one of the wealthiest Caribbean islands, with a per capita GDP of 
US$33,700 in 1997. The three islands cover 102 sq. miles, have a population of 
approximately 43,000, and are a UK Overseas Territory, see Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3 here 
 
Financial services and tourism provide the backbone to the country’s economy. As a result of 
various government initiatives in the 1960s (specifically innovative taxation and banking 
laws that led to a rapid expansion of the islands’ banking industry) coupled with an 
investment in tourism infrastructure, the Cayman Islands have experienced a booming 
economy since the 1970s (Johnson, 2001). The small size of the Cayman Islands is reflected 
in the government which comprises 18 Members, 15 of whom are the elected representatives 
for the Islands' six districts. The Cayman Islands lie within the North Atlantic hurricane belt 
and are seasonally affected by tropical depressions, tropical storms and tropical cyclones 
(hurricanes). The recent storms affecting the Cayman Islands (specifically Grand Cayman – 
WMO weather station identifier: MWCR) are shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 here 
 
In relation to their island neighbours the Cayman Islands tend to fare reasonably well during 
and after tropical cyclones, although economic losses can still be significant, see McLaughlin 
(1994) and ECLAC (2005). In part this can be attributed to the actions of the National 
Hurricane Committee (NHC) – the public-private partnership that manages hurricane disaster 
risk reduction. The NHC has evolved from a committee of volunteer civil servants loosely 
organised by government to a formalised efficient quasi-government management 
organisation, chaired by the Chief Secretary, a politically appointed civil service position. As 
directed in the Emergency Powers Law (2006b), the committee takes over all aspects of 
hurricane preparedness, response and recovery in the event of a disaster, yet the role and 
structure of the committee emerged as much from luck as by design. While the NHC 
produced its first comprehensive national hurricane plan in 1989 (Tompkins, 2005), there 
were a series of domestic and international events – including government departmental 
reorganisation, changes in development and planning regulations, including a strengthening 
of the Building Code (2006a) in 1995/6, and changes to the Development and Planning 
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Regulations (2005) in 2002 to increase waterfront set back for beach construction (see also 
Tompkins and Hurlston, 2003) and a rising global prioritisation of risk (Tompkins, 2005) – 
that allowed the nascent NHC to garner support and become a trusted cornerstone in 
hurricane risk management in the Cayman Islands. 
 
The success of the NHC can be viewed in comparison with other country responses to 
hurricanes. For example, in 2004 when Hurricane Ivan battered the islands (Ivan was 
approximately the same magnitude as Hurricane Katrina that hit New Orleans the following 
year), only two fatalities occurred despite extensive wind damage and flooding of the islands 
(McCarthy, 2005)2.  To have such a low level of fatalities from such a major storm is 
testament to the work of the NHC. If the effectiveness of government response to storms is 
measured by the length of time it takes the government to prepare (full shuttering of 
government buildings in less than 6 hours), the number of fatalities directly resulting from 
storm impacts (reported to be less than 5 in the past 30 years), and the length of time to return 
the economy to full function after a major storm, the Islands fare considerably well in 
comparison with their island neighbours (details of this case study can be found in Tompkins, 
2005; and Tompkins and Hurlston, 2003).  
 
Four factors appear to have enabled the transformation of the NHC: the committee is 
supported by the population; it is a learning-based institution that actively requires managers 
to draw on mistakes made in previous years; it is operating within a government context 
where the policy focus is on mainstreaming disaster risk reduction; and there is buy-in from 
critical stakeholders. We now consider each in turn. 
 
Despite some frustrations, there is general popular support for the NHC (reported in 
Tompkins and Hurlston, 2003).  Part of the support for the NHC came from its humble 
beginnings. Although members of the initial committee were volunteers, they were highly 
motivated, enthusiastic and trusted civil servants who were seen to be investing time and 
energy beyond ‘what was required’ to improve hurricane planning in the islands. The strong, 
influential and well-respected chair of the NHC (the Chief of the Fire Department) worked 
diligently to raise the profile of hurricane risk within the government. In short, the committee 
benefited from the participation of committed, hard working and trusted volunteers, from the 
high level of inclusiveness across government departments and from a willingness to consider 
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any approaches that might work. A detailed discussion of the development of the NHC can be 
found in Tompkins and Hurlston (2003).  
 
Learning from past years successes and failures has been an integral feature of the response 
strategy (National Hurricane Committee, 2006), in this way the Cayman Islands’ Government 
has avoided the ‘blame culture’. At the end of every hurricane season the committee reviews 
what it has done effectively the year before and what has not worked. Consequently, the 
national hurricane plan is revised annually and mistakes are not repeated nor bad-practices 
institutionalised. Hurricane preparedness exercises are a diary entry and budget item in all 
government officials year plans from April to December.  This deliberate and explicit 
acknowledgement of the time, staff and financial resources required to be prepared for 
hurricanes is critical to the learning process.  Learning can only occur where there is space 
for innovation and institutional adjustment (Clark et al., 2001). Evidence of responsive 
adjustment can be seen in the changing composition of the NHC after the islands suffered 
from the major impacts of Hurricane Ivan in 2004 and Hurricane Gilbert in 1988. In each 
case the NHC reviewed its composition (to ensure it maintained the appropriate 
membership), its structure and network arrangements, its funding allocation, and its 
responsibilities. While the National Hurricane Committee is now a formal committee within 
the Cayman Islands Government, it has retained its flexibility, which, in turn, enables it to 
adapt to changing conditions. This flexibility also extends to policymakers since discretion to 
design and implement new initiatives to reduce risk is built-in to disaster risk reduction 
policy. This allows decision makers to make adjustments and take politically motivated 
actions. Whereas this can be harmful in places where corruption is prevalent, decision makers 
in the Cayman Islands assume that the advantages of flexibility outweigh its disadvantages. 
This is particularly true in terms of being able to use political capital for setting development 
priorities or pushing forward long term planning goals. 
 
The Cayman Islands' Government has mainstreamed disaster risk reduction by embedding 
risk management into all areas of policymaking. In 1994, the government carried out an 
insurance and risk management study to assess the potential losses that the Cayman Islands 
might face under different risk scenarios. One outcome of the assessment was the creation of 
a risk management advisory committee to advise the Cayman Islands’ Government Cabinet 
(the Executive Council). Initiatives emerging from this include decentralising risk. This was 
achieved through increasing departmental accountability for some risks. For example rather 
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than providing central insurance for government vehicle drivers, the cost of insurance was 
transferred to the departments. Departments then had a greater incentive to encourage safer 
driving practice as the costs of rising insurance premiums came from the departmental 
budget. Long-term risk management is incorporated through integrated land use planning. 
The Development and Planning Committee within the government requires participation 
from all government departments to ensure that plans rolled out achieve the broader 
objectives of the Cayman Islands’ Government. While all parties do not necessarily agree 
with all elements within these plans, the process of decision making is essentially an 
integrated, cross-departmental one that strives to tie in with the overall national structure.  
 
The final element that enables the Cayman Islands to manage hurricane risk effectively is the 
buy-in of all the critical stakeholders in disaster risk reduction. In the long-term planning 
phase, members of the National Hurricane Committee sit on the various committees that 
advise on long-term planning within the islands, such as the Central Planning Authority that 
allocates planning approval (National Hurricane Committee, 2006). Members of the NHC are 
also involved in long-term planning exercises such as Vision 2008 that set out broad planning 
and development objectives for a 10 year period (Government of the Cayman Islands, 1999). 
Annually, leading actors in the different economic sectors and government departments get 
involved in planning for the next hurricane season. Among the islanders there is a strong 
perception of their dependence on each other to succeed and a staunch belief in collective 
action as the way to get there (Tompkins 2005). In all phases of hurricane response all 
members of the National Hurricane Committee have a role and detailed plans of what they 
should do at what times. Even when there are inevitable complaints that not enough is 
happening fast enough at the recovery phase, there is a general acceptance that the National 
Hurricane Committee is looking after the general well-being of the people of the Cayman 
Islands. Inclusion also means that there is a strong support network throughout the islands. 
This is reinforced year after year as different communities, sectors, businesses and 
government agencies find that they are either affected by a hurricane or involved in the 
response and clear up. 
 
The lesson from the Cayman Islands study is that integrated, learning-based management 
systems, with widespread buy-in and support can deliver long term disaster risk reduction 
benefits. Disaster risk reduction, as practiced in the Cayman Islands can ensure that those 
who are exposed to hazards and those who are sensitive to their impacts are assisted to 
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prepare and cope better.  We now turn to NE Brazil to consider the pre-conditions necessary 
to provide disaster risk reduction benefits with simultaneous development gains in a different 
political, social, geographic and hazard context. 
 
4. Drought-Relief and Policymaking in Northeast Brazil and Ceará: institutions for 
managing climate change 
 
The Northeast region of Brazil is the country’s poorest. It comprises nine states, including 
Ceará – located at the heart of the region’s infamous “polygon of drought” (see Figure 4). In 
2000, Ceará’s GDP per capita was approximately half of the national average (IPLANCE, 
2000).  Despite high levels of poverty, for the past ten years, Ceará has been undergoing a 
remarkable political and socio-economic change that has critically affected its social 
indicators and policymaking process.  Table 2 displays some of these improved numbers. 
 
Figure 4 here 
 
The history of drought in NE Brazil is long and well-documented. In the sixteenth century 
Jesuit missionaries recorded the first stories of devastation and in the 1800s a particularly 
severe El Niño event killed 800,000 (4 percent of the Brazilian population at the time) in NE 
Brazil alone (Villa, 2000: 83; Davis, 2001). More recently, the 1979-83 drought affected 18 
million people and cost approximately US$1.8 billion in emergency programmes (Ribot et 
al., 1996: 293).3
 
Table 2 here 
 
The first hundred years of drought policy in NE Brazil, primarily sought to expand the 
network of water storage infrastructure. Locally know as the “hydraulic solution”, these 
efforts resulted in the massive construction of reservoirs, dams and canals that alleviated 
immediate water shortage but did little to decrease long term vulnerability (Lemos, 2003). 
Especially vulnerable were small non-irrigated farmers whose livelihoods were made 
possible only because of the state’s drought emergency programs, which included the 
distribution of food baskets and drinking water, and the organisation of work fronts — 
(frentes de trabalho) where farmers displaced by drought get less than the minimum wage to 
work for the government on fixing roads, building small dams etc.  
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This approach to drought response was rooted in the high level of politicisation of water 
management and conservation in the region. First, because policymakers equated drought to 
water scarcity – investing in water storage infrastructure seemed to be the right thing to do. It 
was also an approach that allowed local managers to stick to their technical background in 
search of a solution that insulated their work from the messiness of politics. This search for a 
‘technical fix’ to the drought problem also led to substantial investment in climate-related 
data collection and science including cloud-seeding (Lemos, 2003)4. Second, drought 
emergency policy was at the heart of the “drought industry” – that is, the misappropriation of 
public funds earmarked for drought response. The large influx of money into drought-
affected regions engendered widespread corruption and political manipulation of the affected 
populations, who exchanged electoral votes for placement in work fronts and food basket 
programs5 (Lemos and Oliveira, 2004). The potential to accumulate both political and 
financial capital, means that local politicians and those illicitly benefiting from the drought 
industry have little incentive to address drought effectively and proactively.6  As these funds 
filtered into the local power hierarchy, they created a vicious cycle of drought, clientelism, 
and poverty that seemed impossible to break, see Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5 here 
 
By the early 1980s, however, political reform in the region and particularly in Ceará, started 
to take hold (Pessoa, 1987; Tendler, 1997) and affect different policy areas, including drought 
response. A succession of relatively politically progressive governors charged state officials 
with the mission of reforming the state’s drought response apparatus. The new approach 
moved from trying to buffer the effects of drought to emphasising the need to adapt to water 
scarcity. By 1987, state response to drought, at least on paper, had undergone a dramatic 
reform7.  Rather than emergency actions, the state government decided to focus on long-term 
projects associated with communities.  New programmes emphasised rural development and 
alleviation of poverty through agrarian reform, creation of irrigated zones, development of 
hydrographic microbasins, rational water management, development of micro and small 
businesses in the interior, education, basic rural health and sanitation, agro-industry, rural 
extension, creation of food security programmes, community development, etc. (Ribot et al., 
1996).  Although these programmes intended to strengthen the resistance of the rural 
population to drought by stabilising production for the small farmer, their design mostly 
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concentrated on reducing sensitivity to drought instead of longer-term re-distributive policies.  
In addition, many of these initiatives never left the planning stage while others were only 
partially achieved or failed all together. Consequently, large segments of Ceará's poor remain 
significantly vulnerable to climate variability (Lemos et al., 2002).  
 
Similarly to the Cayman Islands case, in Ceará, the presence of flexible organisations capable 
of adaptive learning, stakeholder engagement, and reform-oriented policymakers were critical 
in the improvement of risk reduction mechanisms. In this case study we look at two 
agencies—Civil Defence (CEDEC) and Cogerh (the water management agency)—as 
examples of achievements and limitations associated with these factors.  
 
Civil Defense (CEDEC) had been a fixture in drought relief policy for over three decades. 
Through its several phases, it has gone from a mostly ineffectual actor in the drought industry 
to one of the most active players in drought relief. Behind CEDEC’s progress are both 
political support by a reform-oriented governor and the presence of a cadre of dedicated 
managers who have been able to push for much needed drought-relief reform (Tendler, 1997; 
Lemos, 2003). In addition, CEDEC has been able to learn considerably from past experience 
and apply these lessons to respond to disaster more efficiently and equitably. Although the 
agency acts mostly reactively, the delivery of emergency response has improved markedly 
most notably by neutralising the most corrupt aspects of the drought industry. Its approach to 
drought relief, started in the late 1980s, has improved upon the old clientelistic model in 
several ways.  It democratised local decision making by installing district-based committees 
formed by community representatives (both from the public and private sectors) called 
COMDECs (Comite de Defesa Civil—Civil Defense Committee). These committees are 
responsible for identifying the neediest families in each drought-affected community. Food 
baskets, water trucks and jobs are then distributed within the district to these families. Civil 
Defense officials supervise their workings and try to closely monitor emergency fronts' 
implementation.  However the transition to the more democratic COMDECs was met by 
fierce resistance especially from local politicians threatened by the new system. Despite this 
resistance and persistence of a certain degree of clientelism in the choice of members the 
COMDECs, the system proved an improvement over previous practices and, in 1997, 
managers from the state Civil Defense agency expanded this approach by establishing a 
series of criteria to rank districts according to their vulnerability to drought as well as their 
need for emergency relief (Lemos, 2007a).  These criteria included rainfall quantity and 
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distribution, run-off, yield losses by district, a vegetation index, and levels of social unrest.  
New plans exist to re-structure the emergency programme through the implementation of a 
system of permanent response whose main goal is to decrease vulnerability to climate 
variability.   
 
The second agency, Cogerh, was created in the early 1990s as part of a water reform to 
enhance societal participation and decentralise water resources management in the state. In 
contrast with conventional water agencies, Cogerh included a competent cadre of reform-
oriented managers including engineers, economists, and social scientists responsible for the 
organisation of river basin councils to support water management. The agency was 
responsible for the creation of a number of stakeholder-driven councils, including reservoir 
commissions and river basin committees that have significantly democratised water resources 
management, especially when compared to the old insulated system (Lemos and Oliveira 
2004). Yet, the system remains considerably elite-driven in that poor farmers continue to be 
underrepresented (Taddei, 2005). The combination of social scientists and engineers at 
Cogerh was critical to the agency’s ability to innovate and learn in the process of water 
reform. Although Cogerh was created to be more flexible than other insulated water agencies 
typical of water management in Brazil, its actions seem also make it more vulnerable to 
political influence. For example, the election of a more politically conservative governor in 
the early 2000s has threatened the most progressive aspects of its stakeholder-driven efforts 
(Lemos and Oliveira, 2004). 
 
The evolution of both Cogerh and CEDEC was shaped by the presence of reform-oriented 
managers pushing for their interests at the state level. These policy entrepreneurs were 
committed to pursue reformist goals including the democratisation of decision-making, 
decentralisation, and environmental sustainability. They were also firm believers in societal 
participation and the implementation of stakeholder-driven organisations to support their 
agencies’ missions. These managers are also part of broader reformist networks that provided 
resources (financial and human) and political support. They are formed by an array of actors 
across the public-private divide including domestic and international environmental and anti-
poverty NGOs, leftist politicians, labour unions and even the World Bank (Lemos and 
Oliveira, 2004). The support of these networks for the creation of more responsive and 
equitable disaster risk reduction is critical for the accumulation of the kind of political capital 
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required to push for policy that may threaten entrenched elites such as the ones historically 
benefiting from the drought industry.  
 
If we define long-term engagement by the number of years state structures have been 
involved in drought relief, then the state of Ceará fares well. However, if defined by the 
quality of outcome of this response, then Ceará’s risk management is less successful.  The 
same can be said for integration where, despite concerted efforts from progressive 
governments to integrate policy planning and response with other broader initiatives to 
reduce poverty and vulnerability, substantial gains have remained elusive. The reason may be 
entrenchment of poverty through social institutions combined with the magnitude of need 
after decades of policy failure and inequality. Hence although the state has been attempting to 
implement an integrated and proactive drought policy, structural reform to decrease poverty 
and vulnerability keep eluding Ceará’s policymakers. Notwithstanding, the state risk 
management system has come a long way.  
 
As in the Cayman Islands four elements—flexible organisations, stakeholder engagement, 
reform-oriented policymakers and long term integration of drought response with other 
policies—seem to be increasingly present in some form in drought relief policies in Ceará. 
However, the extent they are able to bring about the depth and breadth of reform required to 
reduce vulnerability has fallen short of the magnitude needed. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions  
 
Clearly the two case studies present very different and contrasting contexts within which 
hazards are managed, yet there are shared lessons from both studies that offer the reader 
guidance on designing and implementing disaster risk reduction. As stated before, our 
empirical research suggests that four factors were critical to improving disaster management 
in both cases. First, the agencies and organisations responsible for disaster management in 
both regions were flexible, able to learn from past success and/or failure and to build on their 
relationship with stakeholders to push for the policy agendas and their implementation. 
Second, a group of committed, reform-minded and politically active actors in the public (in 
NE Brazil) and public and private sectors (in the Cayman Islands) championed a series of 
changes in the approach to disaster that lent it credibility and political feasibility. Third, these 
organisations and individuals sought to integrate disaster response into other social and 
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economic policy processes, creating an approach to disaster response that was a much better 
fit to the changing nature of social disasters and their many stressors beyond the physical 
hazard causing them. Fourth, in both cases there was a long term commitment to investing in 
disaster risk reduction and in collaborative learning-based approaches to managing risk. 
 
A key challenge is finding ways to manage entrenched poverty and exclusion in hazard-prone 
areas. Perhaps as in the case of Ceará, an inability to integrate disaster risk reduction into 
broader poverty-reduction initiatives is at the heart of this issue. Deeply embedded poverty is 
likely to impose limits on the effectiveness of disaster risk reduction. To shift the vulnerable 
and poor out of the conditions that define their long-term vulnerability, disaster risk reduction 
needs to be effectively coupled with other policy interventions. While this message has been 
at the heart of the work of structuralists such as Blaikie et al (1994), Alexander (2000) and 
Pelling (2003), the practice of disaster risk management around the world has mostly 
sidestepped these concerns and focused on addressing the hazard element of the disaster 
rather than the social and economic context in which disasters unfold. 
 
While progress in disaster risk reduction has been well documented and broadly positive (e.g. 
Allen, 2006; Benson et al., 2007), the history of addressing the structural inequalities at the 
root of socio-environmental vulnerabilities has been much less positive (Comfort et al., 1999; 
Glantz and Jamieson, 2000). Not surprisingly deeper structural transformation is not easy to 
implement either economically or politically, as decades of failed development and anti-
poverty interventions demonstrate (Lucas Jnr, 1998). In both regions studied in this article, 
we find that the presence of the four factors for effective risk reduction (flexible, learning-
based, responsive governance; committed, reform-minded and politically active actors; 
disaster risk reduction integrated into other social and economic policy processes; and a long 
term commitment to managing risk) have improved response to disaster even if the outcome 
in the NE Brazil case has fallen short of the magnitude needed. By choosing to focus on these 
four factors, we intentionally pursue a higher level of generalisation that hopefully can be 
relevant to other regions and case studies beyond the two we target, especially systems that 
are increasingly vulnerable to global climate change.  We believe that looking at how systems 
and groups respond to climate variability driven stress can inform future policy focusing on 
prevention and response to a changing climate.  
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We also found that by incorporating well-tested good governance practices in their disaster 
risk reduction, especially stakeholder involvement and more open and democratic decision 
mechanisms, both regions may have paved the way for deeper reform. Especially in the case 
of NE Brazil, the empowerment of local collective action structures may have both diluted 
elite dominance and constrained the most negative aspects of corrupt drought response. 
While these actions are not sufficient to spearhead structural reform, they may wear away the 
inequalities (social, economic, and political) that shape vulnerability in less developed 
regions. To go even further, bridging institutions linking disaster risk managers with the 
development planners are required to ensure that the palliative care offered by disaster risk 
reduction is not used as an alternative to deeper structural surgical reforms that may be 
needed to address the issues of inequality in society. 
 
Climate change is expected to bring greater levels of climate variability and to worsen the 
social and economic stresses that the world’s poor live with. Most of the literature on 
managing current climatic changes such as drying trends in southern Africa and warming 
trends in the Artic recommends that two types of response are needed: short-term coping 
mechanisms and longer-term cultural and social shifts (Thomas et al., 2007; Berkes and Jolly, 
2002), see also (Osbahr et al., In review, 2008). For disaster risk reduction to be effective in 
the context of human induced climate change, it needs to be coupled with more fundamental 
structural reforms to have a significant impact. This means more appropriate sharing of the 
risks and the costs associated with getting people away from hazard-prone areas, and out of 
poverty. It also means the design and implementation of policy that integrates across different 
policies and promotes positive synergies between existing disaster response strategies and 
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1 Removed for review purposes. 
2 While there is no instrumental evidence of the impact of Hurricane Ivan due to a lack of functioning tidal gauges 
and other oceanographic instruments during the storm (Young, S. R. (2004) Impact of Hurricane Ivan in Grand 
Cayman. Understanding and quantifying the hazards, HM Government, Department for International 
Development, , pp. 49.), based water marks on buildings and associated personal recollections, the Department of 
Lands and Survey in the Cayman Islands Government estimates that at the height of the storm 85% of Grand 
Cayman was inundated with seawater. 
3 The 1997 to 1999 drought resulted in approximately 80 percent loss of crop yields in some parts of the Brazilian 
Northeast causing considerable social unrest. 
4 As early as 1910, Northeast Brazil had 124 rain gauges and four hydrometer stations installed. By the early 2000s 
the state of Ceará alone had over 7,000 reservoirs built, many on private properties (see Lemos, M. C. (2007b) 
Whose water is it anyway? Water management, knowledge, and equity in NE Brazil. Water and Equity: Fair 
Practice in Apportioning Water among Places and Values, (Eds, Perry, R., Ingram, H. and Whiteley, J.) MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA.). Of those, only eight have public policy significance.  
5  For example, charges of work fronts clearing land or building dams on private fazendas (large landholdings) of 
phantom workers registered on the fronts, of non-existent tanker trucks contracted to deliver drinking water, of 
families not included in the program because of their local political affiliations are common among critics of 
drought policy in the Nordeste. 
6 For an in-depth discussion of these issues see Lemos, M. C. (2003) A Tale of Two Policies: the Politics of 
Seasonal Climate Forecast Use in Ceara, Brazil, Policy Sciences, 32, 101-123.. 
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7 For the past fifteen years, the state government in Ceará has gone from an entrenched oligarchy of a few 
traditional political families to the most progressive state government in the Northeast.  The shift started in 1987 
with the election of Tasso Jereissati as governor, his succession by Ciro Gomes in 1991, Jereissati return to power 
in 1994, and reelection in 1998. 
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